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my assertion — that lessons can be learned from all forms of
medical mishap — deliberately cuts a broad
swath. Close examination of each of these
types of mishap provides different learning
opportunities.
• Near-misses, or errors that cause no
harm, can trigger a re-evaluation of correct
procedures to prevent these events;
• Adverse events, both “anticipated” and “unanticipated”, can
help clinicians develop more rigorous thinking about evidence and
standards; and
• Sentinel events can show how the protective systems put in
place can be breached.
Collecting extensive information in all these mishap categories
not only leads to interventions to minimise and prevent harm, but
also allows detection of patterns of error. For example, if an
inordinate number of errors occur during night shifts, or when the
change of shift occurs, organisational changes may be required.
Information about mishaps also provides material for teaching
medical students, residents and community practitioners, with the
aim of preventing future errors. If the information prevents errors
then there will be impressive cost savings for hospitals and
healthcare systems, as well as for patients and their families.1
Finally, information about errors and patterns of errors forearms
clinicians to avoid patient injury, thus reducing the stress involved
in suspecting or knowing their actions may have caused harm.
But there remains an ongoing impediment: can healthcare data
systems provide timely information for risk management and
reducing medical mishaps? In the book Medical mishaps. Pieces of
the  puzzle contributors from several countries identified “multiple
overlapping and faulty mechanisms for the revelation, investiga-
tion and mitigation of errors”. There was “clearly considerable
scope for greater collaboration, integration and coordination”.2
And the situation in Australia appears to be no exception. One of
the key priorities of the Australian Council for Safety and Quality
in Health Care (ACSQHC) is enhancing processes for measuring
local quality improvement and aggregate-level reporting of per-
formance and outcomes.3
A report in this issue of the Journal by Kingston and colleagues
(page 36)4 explores the attitudes of the two main health-profes-
sional protagonists involved in reporting medical error. It analyses
the differential use of incident reporting by doctors and nurses,
and attributes this to the different cultures of the two professions.
This finding has been well substantiated. Nurses work in a culture
that responds to directives, including the directive to report
incidents; doctors work in a culture that values intragroup action
and professional–cultural definitions of error or mistake.5
Other, systems factors also influence the decision to report
incidents: time constraints, dissatisfaction with the process, inade-
quate feedback, and failure to value the process.5 In addition, there
may be confusion about what should be reported, feelings of fear
of retribution and doubts about the possibility of remediation.
Finally, what are the views of healthcare consumers? In a study
published in the 7 June issue of the Journal,6 a random sample of
Australians supported vigorous reporting of
errors, and 68% of those surveyed also
wanted disclosure of the identity of the
healthcare worker involved. While this is
understandable, it shows the need to edu-
cate the public about the importance of a
“no-blame” culture to ensure that reports
will be made in the first place. The need for a flow of information
far outweighs fingerpointing. Clinicians want error reduction, and
favour anonymity. Patients and the public want error reduction
and are likely to accept anonymity in the name of this goal.
The ACSQHC supports the principle of “no blame”, and has
recently published a document Open disclosure standard: a national
standard for open communication in public and private hospitals,
following an adverse event in health care. This provides clear guide-
lines for patients, healthcare professionals and organisations con-
fronting and dealing with medical error, and the legal issues
attending such events. Its major message is an open, blame-free
culture.7
Despite the human and systems factors impeding reporting of
medical error, many of these can be overcome by adequate
incident-reporting systems. These have the following characteris-
tics:8
• they are anonymous and easy to use (computerised);
• they acknowledge receipt of a report and confirm that it is
being investigated;
• they report back the results of the investigation in a timely
manner;
• they use the information for programs of reduction;
• they provide feedback about successful reduction efforts; and
• they receive continual public support from key physicians in
leadership positions.
The process of error reduction involves long-term effort. There
needs to be consistent and persistent emphasis on a cycle of
attention to information, patterns revealed by information, error-
reduction efforts, evaluation, more information and more reduc-
tion efforts. These efforts now also include producing informed
patients, who are coached to ask the questions that might avoid
errors.
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We should think about this cyclic process to reduce error as an
ongoing one, always in need of fine-tuning. Its effectiveness
depends on clinical leadership providing a continuing example in
error reporting.
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n 1995, the tragedy in paediatric cardiac surgery at the Bristol
Royal Infirmary, exposed by a whistleblower, ended the laissez-
faire approach to patient safety, management of clinical quality
and professional self-regulation in the National Health Service
(NHS). Indeed, the impending impact of the Bristol case was
poignantly captured by an editorial in the British Medical Journal,
entitled “All changed, changed utterly”.1
Britain may not be alone in whistleblowing. In this issue of the
Journal, Faunce and Bolsin report on three such recent events in
Australia2 (page 44). These show an uncanny commonality with
the Bristol case.
What has happened in the NHS since 1995?
In the immediate aftermath of Bristol, the then Health Secretary,
Frank Dobson, took urgent action to place a duty of quality of care
on chief executives of NHS Trusts, effectively ending any doubt
about where responsibility would lie. In 1998, the new Labour
government introduced two white papers, The new NHS: modern,
dependable3 and A first class service: quality in the NHS.4 Although
these described the regulatory framework for a quality-oriented
healthcare service in England, the principles were to apply across
the UK. Subsequent policy papers have added many refinements
— including some 42 quasi-autonomous regulatory bodies in
healthcare. These have just been pruned after criticisms of overly
oppressive regulation.
The following are key elements of change in England:
• The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) is tasked
to develop evidence-based clinical guidelines and to assess and
evaluate new technologies and pharmaceuticals for the NHS.
• Complementing the clinical guidelines, National Service
Frameworks were created to map out the essential ingredients of
good clinical service provision. Originally, there were three — for
coronary heart disease, cancer and mental health. Paediatric care
was added after the report of the Bristol Inquiry.5
However, the focal process for the delivery of clinical care is
clinical governance, which is defined as “a framework through
which NHS organisations are accountable for continuously
improving the quality of their services and safeguarding standard-
ised care by creating an environment in which excellence in
clinical care can flourish”.3 To monitor compliance, the govern-
ment established the Commission for Health Improvement, which
was superseded this year by the independent Commission for
Health Audit and Inspection, to regulate institutional quality in
both the public and private healthcare sectors.
Adding to all this bureaucracy and control are bodies with more
specific functions. For example, the National Patient Safety Agency
manages the reporting and analysis of “near misses”. The National
Clinical Assessment Authority advises NHS Trusts and comple-
ments the work of the General Medical Council (GMC) in
assessing and retraining poorly performing doctors. In addition,
there is a new, overarching body for coordinating the regulators of
the individual health professions — the Council for the Regulation
of Health Professionals. For the citizens, the Commission for
Patient and Public Involvement in Health, together with local
Patients’ Forums, is to champion and promote public participation
in the direction of local health services. This is a breathtaking array
that even the distant observer in Australia might find daunting.
For doctors, the regulatory landscape has also changed dramati-
cally. The recent consultant and general practitioner NHS contracts
increase employers’ control over the organisation of medical work,
incorporate performance incentives and strengthen accountability.
But it is the GMC’s proposals for doctors’ registration, training and
discipline that are potentially most far reaching.
The GMC changes began in 1992 with a new approach to basic
medical training — Tomorrow’s doctors.6 Even more radical was the
publication, in 1995, of a patient-centred code of practice, Good
medical practice.7 If embedded successfully in the medical culture,
the code will lead to positive changes in attitude on matters such as
communication with patients and colleagues, teamwork, risk
management, transparency, and whistleblowing. To strengthen
compliance, the GMC tied the code directly to registration in
1998. The full effect will begin to be felt in 2005, when all UK
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